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ON THE BIFURCATIONS OF EQUILIBRIA OF A
LOCALLYCOURNOT ECONOMIC MODEL
JUAN L.G. GUIRAO1, MIGUEL A. LÓPEZ2, JAUME LLIBRE3, RAQUEL MARTÍNEZ4
Abstract. Guirao and Rubio [6] introduces an economic model, which gener-
alizes the classical duopoly of Cournot type, where the competitors are located
around a circle or a line and each ﬁrm competes à la Cournot with its right
and left neighboring. For the case of having three and four players we describe
completely the bifurcations of equilibria in terms of the production costs of each
ﬁrm and we study the stability of them. Moreover, for the case of four players
we provide some information on twoperiodic orbits.
1. Introduction and statement of the main result
Cournot duopoly was introduced by Agustin Cournot [2] who is consider on of the
forerunner of the modern microeconimics. The process consist of two ﬁrms which
produce an identical good and which compete for the market. In each step of the
process the ﬁrms decide the amount of product which introduce in the market and
for making this decission both ﬁrms know the amount of product introduced in the
market in the previous step by the rival ﬁrm. This economic process is mathematically
modeled by the following twodimensional discrete dynamical system
(1) F (x, y) = (g(y), f(x))
where f, g are continuous selfmaps deﬁned on a compact interval which can be con-
sidered, without loss of generality, by normalization [0, 1]. The maps f and g are
called the reaction functions and determine the decisions maked by the ﬁrms.
Note that if ﬁrm A put on the market at the beginning of the game α0 product
and ﬁrm B put β0, in the next step of the game ﬁrm A will produce g(β0), i.e. an
amount of product which directly depends on the production level of the ﬁrm B in
the previous step, on the other hand ﬁrm B will produce f(α0) and so on. Therefore,
all the process is governed by the dynamics of the discrete system (1) which strongly
depends on the dynamics of the onedimensional interval maps f and g.
Duopoly is an intermediate situation between monopoly and perfect competition,
and analytically is a more complicated case. The reason for this is that oligopolist
must consider not only the behaviors of the costumers, but also those of the com-
petitors and their reactions, thus this model has been studied in the literature from
diﬀerent points of view, see for instance [1], [3] [4], [7], [8] [9], [10], [11] or [12].
Key words and phrases. Discrete dynamical systems and Economics, Cournot Duopoly, Cournot
like model, equilibrium point.
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While dynamic properties of duopolies have been extensively studied, adjustment
dynamics in Cournot processes with more than two players has received much less
attention as a consequence of the diﬃculties which appear for studing discrete dy-
namical systems with dimension higher than two. The direct generalization of the
Cournot duopoly situation is the Cournot oligopoly, i.e. consider n ﬁrms which pro-
duce and identical good and in each step of the process any ﬁrm knows the amoung
of product generated by the n− 1 rival ﬁrms in the previous step. Now, the systems
which models the situation is given by
(2) F (x1, x2, ..., xn) = (f1(x2, x3, ..., xn), f2(x1, x3, ..., xn), ..., fn(x1, x2, ..., xn−1))
where fi : [0, 1]
n−1 → [0, 1] is a continuous map. We note that the reaction function
fi depends on n− 1 variables of indices j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, j 6= i.
To study the dynamics for a system like (2) is quate complicated by the ignorance
of the topological dynamics of ndimensional discrete dynamical systems with n > 2
(e.g., note that for these type of systems are not characterized the possible ωlimit
sets of the orbits).
Thus, if we want to have some chance of describing dynamics we need to simplify
the system with the cost of lossing information by the players on the production level
of the rivals.
In [5] is introduced the following model called Cournotlike system:
Deﬁnition 1. A continuous map φ from [0, 1]n into itself is Cournotlike if it is of
the form:
φ(x1, x2, ..., xn) = (φσ(1)(xσ(1)), ..., φσ(n−1)(xσ(n−1)), φσ(n)(xσ(n)),
where φi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is continuous, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and σ is a cyclic permutation
of the set {1, 2, ..., n}.
In the economic situation models by these type of systems the level of information
is quite limited because any player ﬁrm only has information on the production level
of one of the other ﬁrms in the previous step of the process. For these type of systems,
see [5], there is a characterization of the dynamical simplicty.
From our point of view Cournotlike models not represent a truthful economic
situation since it is very diﬃcult to explain the fact that each player ﬁrm only can
has information on other ﬁrm having a complete ignorance on the rest of player
behaviour. For that reason Guirao and Rubio [6] introduces a new model where the
information level is higher than in Cournotlike ones and where there is more chance
for describing dynamical properties. See next section for a concret description of this
model. The aim of the present paper is, for dimensions 3 and 4, to describe completely
the bifurcations of equilibria of this new model in terms of the production costs of
each ﬁrm and we study the stability of them. Moreover, for the case of four players
we provide some information on twoperiodic orbits. The statement of our the main
results is:
Theorem 2. Let (F3,Ω3) be the discrete dynamical system introduced in (3). Then:
(i) if c1, c2 and c3 are not equal, there exists a unique equilibrium equal to (0, 0, 0)
which is strongly unstable;
(ii) if ci = c, i = 1, 2, 3, there exists another equilibrium, apart from the stated in
(i), of the form ( 29c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c ) which is locally an attractor.
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Theorem 3. Let (F4,Ω4) be the discrete dynamical system introduced in (4). Then:
(i) if c1, c2, c3 and c4 are arbitrary positive constant, the point (0, 0, 0, 0) is a
strongly unstable equilibrium;
(ii) if ci = c, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the point (
2
9c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c ) is a stable equilibrium;
(iii) if c1 = c3 and c2 6= c4 the point
(
α2,
√
2α2
c2
− 2α2, α2,
√
2α2
c4
− 2α2
)
, where α
is the unique root of the cubic polynomial
−√2c2c4(√c2 +√c4)+2(c1c2 + c1c4 + 2c2c4 + 2c1√c2c4)X
−6c1
√
2c2c4(
√
c2 +
√
c4)X
2 + 9c1c2c4X
3,
is an equilibrium. Its stability depends of the values of c2 and c4. In the case
ci = c, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the equilibrium coincides with the presented one in (ii);
(iv) if c2 = c4 and c1 6= c3, the equilibria are symmetric to the ones of case (iii)
interchanging z with w, x with y, c2 with c1, and c4 with c3.
Moreover in the case ci = c, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, we have a twoperiodic orbit of the system
of the form (x, y, z, w) where x = z = −8 3
1
3+(9+7
√
33)
2
3
3
2
3 (9+7
√
33)
1
3 c
and y = w = 0.
2. The model
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players (i.e., rival ﬁrms which produces an
identical good) and assume that are physically located around a circle or a line. We
assume that the ﬁrms compete à la Cournot in a local way, i.e., each ﬁrm i ∈ N
compete with its closest neighboring in the right and left direction. Let Bαi ⊂ N
be the neighboring located to distance equal to α of the ﬁrm i in the right and left
direction. If we denote by (x1, ..., xn) the production of the ﬁrms in some moment
and by (c1, c2, ..., cn) their production costs, the best response function for the ﬁrm i
will have the form
φi(xBα
i
) =
√∑
k∈Bα
i
xk
ci
−
∑
k∈Bα
i
xk.
We consider that Bαi is composed by the left and right neighboring, i.e., α = 1.
In this case, we note that if n = 2, we have the classical situation of the Cournot
duopoly.
If we suppose that the number of players is equal to three, the model is governed
by the threedimensional discrete dynamical system given by
(3) F3(x, y, z) =
(√
y + z
c1
− (y + z),
√
x+ z
c2
− (x+ z),
√
x+ y
c3
− (x+ y)
)
deﬁned in Ω3 = {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : x+ y > 0, x+ z > 0, y + z > 0}.
In the same way, for the case of having four ﬁrms, the model is deﬁned by a
fourdimensional discrete system F4(x, y, z, w) of the form (x, y, z, w) goes to
(4)(√
y + w
c1
− (y + w),
√
x+ z
c2
− (x+ z),
√
y + w
c3
− (y + w),
√
x+ z
c4
− (x+ z)
)
deﬁned in Ω4 = {(x, y, z, w) ∈ R4 : y + w > 0, x+ z > 0}.
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The objective of the next section is to study the equilibria of systems (3) and (4)
in terms of production costs c′is. In the case n = 4 we give some information on the
twoperiodic orbits.
3. Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we state the equilibria and their bifurcations for the system (3)
depending on c′is.
Proof of Theorem 2. We consider the map F3 given by
(x, y, z)→
(√
y + z
c1
− (y + z),
√
x+ z
c2
− (x+ z),
√
x+ y
c3
− (x+ y)
)
.
A point (x, y, z) will be an equilibrium point if and only if is held simultaneously
• k1 =
√
y+z
c1
− (x+ y + z) = 0,
• k2 =
√
x+z
c2
− (x+ y + z) = 0,
• k3 =
√
x+y
c3
− (x+ y + z) = 0.
Clearly, one solution of the system, for any value of c′is, is (0, 0, 0). Now, consider the
equivalent system e1 = e2 = e3 = 0 where
• e1 = k1 − k2
• e2 = k1 − k3
• e3 = k2 − k3
It is easy to note that the case c3 = c1 + c2 does not provide any ﬁxed point diﬀerent
from the origin. If c3 is diﬀerent from c1 + c2, the solution of the system e1 = e2 =
e3 = 0 is
x = − 2c1z
c1 + c2 − c3 +
√
2z
c1 + c2 − c3 ,
y = − 2c2z
c1 + c2 − c3 +
√
2z
c1 + c2 − c3 ,
z = − 2c3z
c1 + c2 − c3 +
√
2z
c1 + c2 − c3 .
This system has a solution diﬀerent from z = 0 in the case ci = c, i = 1, 2, 3. Thus,
the solution has the form(
−2z +
√
2z
c
,−2z +
√
2z
c
,−2z +
√
2z
c
)
,
now for the equilibrium condition
−2z +
√
2z
c
= z,
and therefore the equilibrium point has the form
(
2
9c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c
)
.
In short, we obtain that (0, 0, 0) is always an equilibrium point, and when c1 =
c2 = c3 then
(
2
9c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c
)
is another equilibrium point.
BIFURCATIONS OF EQUILIBRIA LOCALLYCOURNOT ECONOMIC MODEL 5
For studing the stability of the equilibria we compute the matrix M composed by
the partial derivatives of the reaction functions of F . Indeed,
M =

∂F 13
∂x
∂F 13
∂y
∂F 13
∂z
∂F 23
∂x
∂F 23
∂y
∂F 23
∂z
∂F 33
∂x
∂F 33
∂y
∂F 33
∂z
 =

0 −1 + 1
2c1
√
y+z
c1
−1 + 1
2c1
√
y+z
c1
−1 + 1
2c2
√
y+z
c2
0 −1 + 1
2c2
√
y+z
c2
−1 + 1
2c3
√
y+z
c3
−1 + 1
2c3
√
y+z
c3
0
 .
In this setting we conclude that the origin is strongly unstable in all directions
because the partial derivatives which appear in the matrix M tend to inﬁnity when
(x, y, z) → 0. Let assume that the costs c′is are equal to c, then the characteristical
polynomial of the matrix M evaluated at the equilibrium point
(
2
9c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c
)
is equal
to Pλ =
1
32 (−1 + 6λ − 32λ3). Note now that the roots of Pλ are equal to 14 double
and − 12 . Thus, the equilibrium point
(
2
9c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c
)
is locally an attractor because the
absolute value of the eigenvalues at this ﬁxed point are smaller than 1, ending the
proof.
Remark 4. The dynamics on the straight line x = y = z when c1 = c2 = c3 = c,
is equivalent to the dynamics of an onedimensional map f : R → R deﬁned by
f(x) =
√
2x
c − 2x. On the line x = y = z the ﬁxed point x = 29c is an attractor. The
point x = 0 is strongly unstable.
4. Proof of Theorem 3
The equations of the equilibria points of the system (Ω4, F4) where F4 is the trans-
formation such that every (x, y, z, w) goes to(√
y + w
c1
− (y + w),
√
x+ z
c2
− (x+ z),
√
y + w
c3
− (y + w),
√
x+ z
c4
− (x+ z)
)
are the following:
• k1 =
√
y+w
c1
− (x+ y + w) = 0,
• k2 =
√
x+z
c2
− (x+ y + z) = 0,
• k3 =
√
y+w
c3
− (y + w + z) = 0,
• k4 =
√
x+z
c4
− (x+ z + w) = 0.
On the other hand the matrixM composed by the partial derivatives of the reaction
functions of F4 is
M =

0 −1 + 1
2c1
√
w+y
c1
0 −1 + 1
2c1
√
w+y
c1
−1 + 1
2c2
√
x+z
c2
0 −1 + 1
2c2
√
x+z
c2
0
0 −1 + 1
2c3
√
w+y
c3
0 −1 + 1
2c3
√
w+y
c3
−1 + 1
2c4
√
x+z
c4
0 −1 + 1
2c4
√
x+z
c4
0

where entry ai,j correspond to
∂F i4
∂αj
with α1 = x, α2 = y, α3 = z and α4 = w.
Clearly, by the two previous expressions, always (0, 0, 0, 0) is a ﬁxed point strongly
unstable because the derivatives of the linear part of the map at it goes to inﬁnity.
We consider now three diﬀerent cases:
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• Case c1 = c2 = c3 = c. In this case the equilibria equations are reduced to
−x− 2y +
√
2y
c
= 0, −2x+
√
2x
c
− y = 0.
Solving this system we obtain that there is an additional equilibrium point
of the form ( 29c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c ,
2
9c ) which is locally stable because its eigenvalues are
(0, 0, −12 ,
1
2 ) if we assume that c > 0.• Case c3 = c1 and c4 6= c2. In this setting equations of equilibria have the form
−w − x− y +
√
x+ y
c1
= 0 where w = −2x+
√
2x
c4
and y = −2x+
√
2x
c2
.
Computing, we reduce the problem to solve
(5) 3x−
√
2x
c2
−
√
2x
c4
+
√√√√−4x+√ 2xc2 +√ 2xc4
c1
= 0.
We can assume that x is not zero, otherwise we obtain the equilibrium point
(0, 0, 0, 0). Dividing equation (5) by
√
x we obtain
(6) 3
√
x−
√
2
c2
−
√
2
c4
+
√√√√−4 +√ 2c2x +√ 2c4x
c1
= 0.
Replacing in equation (6) variable
√
x by X we have
(7) 3X −
√
2
c2
−
√
2
c4
+
√√√√−4X +√ 2c2 +√ 2c4
c1X
= 0.
Now, we eliminate the squareroot containg the variable X in equation (7)
taking squares, but note that doing this we can add ﬁctious solutions. Thus,
is
−√2c2c4(√c2 +√c4)+2(c1c2 + c1c4 + 2c2c4 + 2c1√c2c4)X(8)
−6c1
√
2c2c4(
√
c2 +
√
c4)X
2 + 9c1c2c4X
3 = 0,(9)
and therefore computing is stated that the pointα2,√2α2
c2
− 2α2, α2,
√
2α2
c4
− 2α2
 ,
where α is the unique root of the cubic polynomial (8) is an equilibrium of the
system diﬀerent from the origin. Note that the stability of this equilibrium
depends on the values of c2 and c4 and in the case ci = c, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the
equilibrium coincides with the presented one in (ii).
• Case c4 = c2 and c3 6= c1. In fact the equilibria points are symmetric to ones
obatined in the previous case interchanging z with w, x with y, c2 with c1,
and c4 with c3.
For the case ci = c, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, we study the twoperiodic orbits of the system (i.e.,
nonequilibria points with the property F 2(x, y, z, w) = (x, y, z, w).) In general the
equations of the twoperiodics points are the following:
• g1 = w + y + z −
√
w+y
c3
−
√
x+z
c2
+
√
−w−x−y+
√
w+y
c3
−z+
√
x+z
c2
c1
= 0,
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• g2 = 2w + y −
√
w+y
c1
−
√
w+y
c3
+
√
−2w−2y+
√
w+y
c1
+
√
w+y
c3
c2
= 0,
• g3 = w + y + x−
√
w+y
c1
−
√
x+z
c2
+
√
−w−x−y+
√
w+y
c1
−z+
√
x+z
c2
c3
= 0,
• g4 = w + 2y −
√
w+y
c1
−
√
w+y
c3
+
√
−2w−2y+
√
w+y
c1
+
√
w+y
c3
c4
= 0.
For the case ci = c, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, is g1 − g3 = 0 and g2 − g4 = 0 which means
x = z and w = y, so introducing this into the system of equations and solving
which the adequate computational tool we obtain that the point (x, y, z, w) where
x = z = −8 3
1
3+(9+7
√
33)
2
3
3
2
3 (9+7
√
33)
1
3 c
and y = w = 0 is a twoperiodic orbit of the system,
ending the proof.
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